Reduction of the wage share of income and increasingly precarious employment by Velázquez Orihuela, Daniel
Reduction of the wage share 
of income and increasingly 
precarious employment
Daniel Velázquez Orihuela1
“Keep workers insecure and keep them under control, and they’re not going to ask for 
decent wages or decent working conditions, or the right of free association, meaning 
unionizing. Now for the masters of mankind that’s fine. They make their profits. But for 
the population it’s devastasting.” (Requiem for the American Dream, 2015). 
Abstract
The economic globalization that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s has 
generated job insecurity for workers. This coincides with two trends: a reduction 
in the wage share of income and increasingly precarious employment, both of 
which have been seen in most market economies since the early 1980s. This article 
proposes an efficiency-wage model in a demand-constrained equilibrium scenario, 
to explain how rising job insecurity has reduced the wage share of income and made 
employment more precarious. An additional virtue of this model is that it explains 
several features of the Mexican labour market observed in recent decades. 
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I. Introduction
A salient feature of the globalization of production, which began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
has been the relocation of production by transnational corporations to reduce labour costs. This has 
allowed such firms to undertake their labour-intensive processes in countries that have low wages and 
permissive labour regulations. The threat that production could be offshored has generated a state 
of insecurity among workers and has diminished their unions’ bargaining power (Kalleberg, 2009). In 
addition, the collapse of the socialist bloc released millions of people on to the global labour market. 
Faced with this excess labour force, many of the world’s poor countries have opted to compete for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering low wages and flexible, or non-existent, labour regulations 
that allow and facilitate costless dismissal, which has generated a sense of job insecurity (Requiem for 
the American Dream, 2015). The perception of job insecurity among workers is one of the main effects 
that the globalization of production has had on labour markets, and is currently one of their key features 
in most cases (Kalleberg, 2009).
Production globalization, and the job insecurity it has generated, coincide with two major trends: 
a reduction in the wage share of income and the increasing precariousness of employment. Both of 
these started at the same time as globalization.
The shrinking wage share of income and increasing precariousness of employment are two 
trends that have been observed in rich and poor countries alike (IMF, 2007; ILO/OECD, 2015; 
Kalleberg, 2009). However, emerging and developing countries have experienced a more pronounced 
and steeper reduction in the share of wages in national income (ILO, 2011; Stockhammer, 2009) and 
a faster growth of precarious employment (Vázquez, Macias and Lawson, 2018) than has been the 
case in the rich countries.
According to ILO (2018), 46% of workers in emerging economies and 76% of those in poor 
countries are in vulnerable forms of employment. As a counterpart of this phenomenon, in Asia, the 
wage share of national income has decreased by more than 20 percentage points since 1994, and in 
North African countries, it has shrunk by over 30 percentage points since 2000.
In Latin America, while the decline has been more moderate, barely exceeding 10% since 1993, 
it has also been gathering pace (ILO, 2011). Abeles, Amarante and Vega (2014) claim that the labour 
share of output is declining in most Latin American countries, even when the income of self-employed 
workers is considered. Alarco (2014, 2016 and 2017) posits a common history in most Latin American 
countries, in which the wage share in 1950–2012 completes two cycles: the first cycle peaks in the 
mid-1960s, before dropping to a floor in the mid-1980s. The second peaks in the mid-1990s and 
reaches the bottom of the cycle between 2004 and 2006.2 Nonetheless, the long-term trend of the 
wage share has been down: it was higher between 1950 and 1979 than in 1980–2014. In other words, 
wages gained their largest share when the import substitution industrialization model was more intense 
or when sociopolitical circumstances favoured workers; in contrast, the minimum levels occur after the 
debt crisis of 1980, when pro-market policies were in force. 
This article aims to show that job insecurity is one of the causes of both the increasing precariousness 
of employment and the shrinking share of wages in income. To this end, an efficiency-wage model is 
constructed in a demand-constrained equilibrium scenario. This analytical framework is used to study 
the mechanisms through which heightened insecurity of employment causes jobs to become more 
precarious and the wage share of income to decline. The model has the additional virtue of reproducing 
and explaining some of the characteristics of the Mexican labour market. 
2 During the first five years of this century, the personal distribution of income improved, even though the wage share of income 
declined. This may reflect an underestimation of the income of the wealthiest percentiles (Abeles, Amarante and Vega, 2014).
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The article is divided into five sections, of which section II, following this introduction, identifies 
some of the characteristics of the Mexican labour market. Section III constructs an efficiency-wage 
model in a demand-constrained equilibrium scenario to provide a common explanation for the income 
concentration, increasingly precarious employment and characteristics of the Mexican labour market 
discussed in the second section. Section IV presents a numerical example of the theoretical model; 
and the fifth and final section sets forth the conclusions of the study.
II. Selected characteristics of the 
Mexican labour market
In recent decades, income concentration and increasingly precarious employment have been permanent 
features of the Mexican economy, and have been accompanied by the following trends:
(i) Although the labour share of national income has been shrinking ever since 1976, the decline has 
gathered pace in the last decade (Ros, 2015; Samaniego, 2014; Luyano and Herrera, 2018).
(ii) Since 2008, wages have converged downward, with the median of high wage segments falling 
faster than that of the lower segments. This has narrowed the wage gap between different 
worker categories, whether classified by their occupational position, by years of schooling, or 
by whether they work in the formal or the informal sector of the economy (Colmex, 2018).
The following developments have occurred in the last two decades:
(iii) The number of low-paying jobs has increased, while the number of high-paying jobs has declined.3 
(iv) Precarious jobs (defined as those that lack access to social security, offer only a temporary 
contract or none at all, and where pay is equal to or less than a minimum wage) have increased 
(Colmex, 2018). 
(v) While the average growth rate of labour productivity has slowed, the productivity of the tradable 
goods manufacturing sector has surged (Ros, 2013 and 2015).
To provide an explanation for these trends, the next section develops an efficiency-wage model in 
demand-constrained equilibrium scenarios, with special emphasis on the processes that drive income 
concentration and make employment more precarious. It is important to clarify that the model identifies 
precarious employment on the basis of three characteristics: lower wages, greater effort made by 
workers and heightened job insecurity.4
III. The model
1. Initial conditions
The starting point is an economy consisting of a large number of producers and consumers. The latter 
can be classified in two social classes. However, all members of each class have the same set of tastes 
and preferences; and, similarly, all firms have the same production function. This makes it possible to 
work with a single representative firm and one representative consumer for each social class. 
3 As an example of the above: (i) in 2008 there were 1.5 million more workers earning over three times the minimum wage than 
in 2014; and (ii) the percentage of employees (paid subordinate workers) being paid less than the minimum wage increased 
from 14.4% in 2000 to 24.0% in 2017 (Samaniego, 2014; Colmex, 2018). 
4 There is no consensus on all of the characteristics needed to identify the “precarious work” category. In most of the specialized 
literature, however, they include low wages, job insecurity and the intensity or length of the working day. 
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Social classes are distinguished by two characteristics: (i) their income source; and (ii) their tastes 
and preferences. Distinguishing social classes by their income source is typical of both classical and 
Marxist theory. Workers whose sole source of income is their labour, which is employed and paid for 
by firms, are called proletarians; and the owners of capital, whose main source of income is the profits 
of the enterprises they own, are called capitalists. Following this tradition, this article will also refer to 
the two social classes as “proletariat” and “capitalist”. In addition to the difference based on income 
source, it is assumed that capitalists employ labour to increase their leisure or make it more enjoyable.
In this model, proletarians have two work alternatives: the first is in firms (referred to as conventional 
employment); and the second is self-employment. Self-employed workers do not have the capital or the 
organization to set up a formal enterprise, so they supply their labour services to capitalist consumers, 
to increase the latter’s leisure or make it more enjoyable. The only income that self-employed workers 
receive is the wage paid to them by capitalist consumers. This means that there are two production 
sectors: a conventional sector, in which firms produce goods, and another sector in which the 
self-employed supply their services. 
Information is asymmetric and imperfect, so neither firms nor capitalist consumers can identify 
which of their workers are exerting themselves and which are not. It will be assumed that worker effort 
increases as wages or the subjective probability of dismissal increases. As a result all employers pay 
an efficiency wage, i.e., they pay the wage that maximizes their rate of profit or utility, as applicable. 
The positive relations that exist between wages and effort and between the probability of dismissal 
and effort are standard assumptions in efficiency-wage theory (Caraballo, 1996). The probability of 
dismissal is usually represented by the unemployment rate. However, this study assumes that the 
subjective probability of dismissal reflects the workers’ perception of job insecurity, which, in addition 
to the unemployment rate, takes into account variables such as the existence and duration of the 
employment contract, the existence of social security, the flexibility of labour legislation and respect for 
labour rights, among other issues.5 Consequently, this perceived likelihood of dismissal can increase 
even without a rise in the unemployment rate.
The self-employed have less job stability, in other words they can be dismissed more easily 
than workers employed in firms. This idea is supported by the fact that the self-employed usually 
lack unions, social security, written contracts and legal protection. In this regard, Mexico’s National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) shows that less than 1% of self-employed workers in the 
Mexican economy have some form of social security (INEGI, 2017).
The subjective probability of dismissal among the self-employed (pb) depends positively on the 
subjective probability of dismissal among conventional workers (pa). This hypothesis is supported by the 
fact that when unemployment rises, the unemployed may turn to self-employment. This will increase 
the supply of services provided by the self-employed and make finding employment harder for all of 
them. In this regard, Ros (2013) recognizes that the low-productivity service sector has become the 
last stage through which Mexican workers move before falling into unemployment. 
The ideas expressed in the previous two paragraphs are formalized in the following hypotheses:






5 According to Corporación Latinobarómetro (2005), 75% of workers in Latin America were afraid of losing their jobs in the next 
12 months, and this percentage rose to 82% in the case of Mexican workers.
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2. Representative firm





0r+ =R W  (1)
Subject to Af ,y e w p la a0 = S R W X (2)
In expressions (1) and (2), (1+ π) is the rate of profit, y0 is the supply of output, w is the real wage, 
la is the firm’s demand for labour, e(w, pa) is the effort function and pa is the subjective probability of 
being fired by the firm.
Where A R! + , e 0w 2l , e 0w 1m , e 0pa 2l , e 0pa 1m , e 0,w pa =m , ,e w 0 02R W , p0 1a1 1   and f is 
a homogeneous function of degree 1.
The formalization of the firm’s rationality axiom has two key features: 
(i) Firms aim to maximize their profit rate, which is defined as the quotient of sales revenue over 
costs. This differs from standard neoclassical theory, which postulates that firms maximize the 
absolute level of profit (the difference between sales and costs). However, it is consistent with 
the classical and Marxist idea that the main variable guiding firms’ decisions is the profit rate. 
More recently, financial investment theory highlights different rates of return as the key variables 
used by investors in deciding where to invest.
(ii) Following Solow (1979), from the standpoint of the individual firm, the wage has two 
characteristics: firstly, it is part of labour costs; and, secondly, it stimulates worker effort. 
Consequently, firms pay the wage that elicits the greatest effort from the worker at the lowest 
possible cost, and enables them to maximize their profit rate.
Solving the maximization exercise (equations (1) and (2))6 gives:

















S R W X
 (4)
Equation (3) is the Solow equation, which ways that producers maximize profit when the wage 
they pay ensures that the elasticity of effort with respect to the wage is unity. The wage that satisfies 
this condition for the firms is called the efficiency wage (wa). 
Equation (4) is a condition that is usually obtained in analytical frameworks that involve maximization 
of the profit rate. It shows that firms maximize when the average and marginal products of labour are 
equal (Noriega, 2001; Velázquez and Hernández, 2018; Velázquez, Vargas and Hernández, 2019). 
Note that equation (3) implies that producers set the wage independently of labour supply and 
demand, so there is no guarantee that the efficiency wage elicits full employment. On the other hand, 
because the production function is homogeneous of degree 1, equation (4) holds for all positive labour 
demand; and the optimal rate of profit is independent of the level of employment, but does depend 
on the wage:
6 See section 1 of annex A1.
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Unlike the profit rate, the absolute level of profit does depend on the level of employment. As 
long as firms offer the efficiency wage, absolute profit will be:
 ,Ae w p w la a a aP = −T S X Y  (6)
















l  the profit rate will be positive, and absolute profit will grow as employment increases, so
that: ,dl















. This does not mean that the level of
employment is unknowable, or that full employment is maintained systematically. Firms will produce only 
what the market demands, because if they produce more they will accumulate unwanted inventories 
and, hence, make losses. Consequently, they adjust their production to the prevailing effective demand, 
and this determines the maximum amount of labour to be hired ydtR W. However, as will be shown in 
part 5 of this section, there is no market mechanism that systematically guarantees a level of effective 
demand that is compatible with full employment.
From the above, it follows that:
 ,y Ae w p ld
a













Equation (7) simply shows that production adjusts to the prevailing effective demand, as a 
condition for obtaining the maximum possible profit; equation (8) expresses firms’ labour demand. This 
is analogous to the employment function proposed by Keynes (1936), since, like the latter, it shows 
that the level of employment depends positively on effective demand. 
3. Proletarian consumer
The proletarian consumer’s rational behaviour is formalized through the following maximization exercise:
 
,max ln lnU c e w p l1p p p i 0a a x= + − −R S RW W X (9)
Subject to wl c
p
0 =  (10)
In expressions (9) and (10), pi (for all i = a, b) is the subjective probability of being fired in the case 
of persons employed in firm (i = a) or in the case of the self-employed (i = b); 0< α <1; c is consumer 
demand, τ is the time that is biologically available for work; and l0 is the labour supply of a conventional 
worker or a self-employed person, as the case may be. The superscript p refers to the representative 
consumer of the proletarian class. Key aspects of the formalization of the rational behaviour of the 
proletarian consumer include the following:
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(i) Utility is modelled as a Cobb-Douglas function; it is therefore well-behaved.
(ii) Proletarian consumers supply efficient labour ,e w p li 0S R W X. Thus, an increase in their effort, 
ceteris paribus, will reduce their utility. 





















Equations (11) and (12) represent habitual purchase and sale plans. Note that labour supply is 
not constant, but varies as worker effort changes.
4. Capitalist consumer
The rational maximizing behaviour of the representative capitalist consumer is formalized as follows:
 ,max ln lnU c e w p l1c c b bb b= + −R S RW W X (13)
Subject to c wl
c
bP = +  (14)
In expressions (13) and (14), 0< β <1; the superscript c refers to the representative consumer of 
the capitalist class; and lb is the capitalist consumer’s demand for labour.
Formalization of the capitalist consumer rationality axiom has four key features:
(i) Similarly to the proletarian consumer’s utility function, the capitalist consumer’s utility is also 
modelled as a Cobb-Douglas function.
(ii) The idea that capitalist consumers’ only source of income is the profit received from the 
enterprises they own implies that capitalist consumers do not supply labour. This is why labour 
supply appears neither in their utility function nor in their budget constraint.
(iii) The hypothesis that capitalist consumers demand labour to increase their leisure or make it 
more enjoyable is formalized by introducing their demand for labour multiplied by effort in their 
utility function.
(iv) Both capitalist consumers and firms know that workers’ effort depends on the wage paid to 
them; so they offer a wage that elicits maximum worker effort and minimizes labour cost. 
The maximization exercise gives the demands of the capitalist consumers and the wage that 
maximizes their utility:
 l w1b b
P= −R W  (15)
 cc bP=  (16)







R W  (17)
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Equation (15) represents the capitalist consumer’s demand for labour, in other words the demand 
for labour supplied by the self-employed. It depends positively on profit and negatively on the wage. 
Equation (16) represents consumption demand and simply shows that capitalists consume a proportion 
of their profit. Equation (17) is the Solow equation, which states that capitalist consumers maximize their 
utility when they pay a wage that ensures that the elasticity of effort relative to the wage is equal to 1; 
in other words when they pay efficiency wages (wb). However, the efficiency wage paid by firms (wa) 
does not necessarily have to be equal to the wage offered by capitalist consumers (wb). This is because 
the self-employed and workers employed by firms have different subjective probabilities of being fired.
Comparing the wages offered by the firms with those received by the self-employed, it follows 
that, as �a < pb then w b < w a. In other words, self-employed earnings are lower than the wages offered 
by firms, because the self-employed have a higher subjective probability of being fired. The reason for 
this is that the greater perception of job insecurity among the self-employed forces them to exert more 
effort than conventional workers to avoid unemployment; consequently, capitalist consumers can pay 
lower wages than firms and still extract the same effort from their workers.
5. Demand-constrained general equilibrium 
The demand-constrained equilibrium is represented by the price and allocation vectors observed 
when output systematically adjusts to effective demand. However, the latter is not large enough to 
guarantee full employment. In the literature, demand-constrained equilibrium is usually explained in 
terms of prices being slow to adjust, which causes agents to engage in out-of-equilibrium transactions 
(Argandoña, Gámez and Mochón, 1996). In contrast to that literature, but analogous to Velázquez 
and Hernández (2018), this paper posits that demand-constrained equilibrium arises because firms’ 
labour hiring plans are not inversely related to the real wage (see equation 8), and because wages are 
independent of labour supply and demand (see equations (3) and (17)). 
The goods and labour markets are represented by the following equations:
 y y 0d 0− =t  (18)
 l l 0a 0z− =  (19)
 l l1 0b 0z c− − =R W  (20)
Equation (18) represents the market for goods; effective demand ydtR W is the sum of all demands 
that can be financed, that is, the consumption plans that agents can afford with the profits they receive 
from firms or with the remuneration they obtain by offering their labour services and being employed. 
Equation (19) represents the “conventional” labour market, which links firms’ demand for labour with 
what workers’ supply; φ is the proportion of labour supply that is employed in this market, where 
φ ∈ (0.1). Equation (20) represents the self-employed labour market, which links the demand for 
labour by capitalist consumers to the labour supplied by the self-employed; γ is the percentage of 
labour employed in this market; consequently, 1 1c z− −R RW W is the unemployment rate.7 Hereinafter 
equation  (19) will be referred to as the “conventional labour market” and equation (20) as the 
“self-employment labour market”.
7 The labour supply hired by firms is φl0 and the labour supply contracted by capitalist consumers is (1-φ)γl0. Consequently, the 
unemployed labour force is (1-φ)(1-γ )l0 and the unemployment rate is (1-φ)(1-γ ).
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Wages in the conventional and self-employment labour markets are determined by equations (3) 
and (17), respectively. Henceforth, it is assumed that the wages paid in these markets are efficiency wages.
Effective demand comprises the sum of the financiable demands of the capitalist consumer and 
























The first term on the right side of equation (21) is the financeable demand of the capitalist 
consumer; the second and third terms are the demand that the proletarian consumer can afford with 
the supply of labour that is employed and remunerated in the conventional labour and self-employment 
markets, respectively. Solving for equilibrium in the goods market, gives:8
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Equation (22) shows that demand-constrained equilibrium is guaranteed in the goods market 
irrespective of the values of φ and γ. That is, whatever the distribution of employment across markets 
and whatever the unemployment rate, output will adjust to effective demand. 
Note that it is impossible to determine the value of φ without assuming that the effective demand 
(equation (8)) or the level of employment used by the firms is known. However, assuming the value of φ 
is known, then γ can be determined as:
 






























Expression (23) makes it clear that there are no market mechanisms guaranteeing that γ is 
equal to 1, in other words that full employment is achieved. This is because nothing ensures that 
effective demand is sufficient to elicit full employment. This result differs from what is usually obtained 
in efficiency-wage models; for example, in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), equilibrium occurs with 
unemployment because the latter is needed to extract a positive effort from workers. In contrast, in 
this analytical approach effort is positive, even is the subjective dismissal rate is 0. 
6. Initial conditions for the analysis of job 
insecurity and the income distribution 
The increasingly precarious nature of employment is a dynamic process that entails a drop in wages, 
greater insecurity in terms of being employed and an increase in the effort made by workers. The 
analysis of how more precarious employment leads to a higher concentration of income, starts from 
a demand-constrained equilibrium and introduces Clower’s (1965) dual decision hypothesis, whereby 
all agents are both buyers and sellers, in that to be able to buy they must first have sold. This means 
that effective demand depends on the labour that the proletarian consumer managed to sell and on 
the profits that firms obtained from their sales, in both cases in the past period. Incorporating this 
hypothesis, gives:9
8 See section 2 of annex A1.
9 See section 2 of annex A1.
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 y l wd a
a
1 1P= +− −t  (24)
In equation (24) the subscript -1 means the variable in question is of the previous period, so it can 
be considered fixed. The effective demand expressed in equation (24) has two characteristics: (i) the 
wage does not carry the subscript because it is a current variable. This is because workers work for a 
period (such as a week or a fortnight), at the end of which they receive their wages, which they then 
use to finance their consumption in the next period; (ii) the consumption of the self-employed does not 
appear as part of effective demand. This is because capitalists finance their demand for both goods 
and labour with the profits they receive from firms; consequently, profits incorporate the consumption 
demand of both self-employed workers and capitalists. 
7. Increasingly precarious employment
The analysis of the increasingly precarious nature of employment assumes that conventional jobs 
become less secure, so the perceived probability of dismissal among workers employed in firms rises. 
Consequently, conventional workers exert more effort to avoid being caught slacking and being fired 
as a result. The increased effort motivates firms to reduce wages, because high wages are no longer 















Greater insecurity in conventional employment increases insecurity in self-employment, because, 
as noted above, workers who lose their jobs in firms will seek self-employment, which makes it harder 






Analogously to what happens with conventional workers, the increase in the subjective probability 
of dismissal among self-employed workers causes them to exert more effort to avoid unemployment. 
The greater effort motivates capitalist consumers to pay lower wages, since their workers are already 



















Expressions (25) and (26) show that wages among workers employed in firms and among 










1 1 a 1= −
t
 (27)
Equation (27) shows that effective demand decreases because the purchasing power of workers 
employed in firms declines. However, lower incomes among the self-employed do not affect effective 
demand. This is because a reduction in the consumption of self-employed workers will be compensated 
by an increase in consumption by capitalists, since the latter use their profits to pay the workers they 
employ. Thus, consumption by both categories of consumer is ultimately financed by profits.
The reduction in effective demand forces firms to adjust their production downwards; so, they 
need to hire fewer workers. Equation (8) gives:
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Inequality (28) shows that there are two reasons why firms’ demand for labour decreases: (i) the 
increase in effort made by each worker e w p e,w p
a
a pa a a+l lS X; and (ii) the decrease in effective demand 
y ,d paltS X. These results imply two key features:
(i) The change in workers’ effort stems from two opposing effects. First, heightened job insecurity 
motivates workers to make a greater effort to avoid unemployment; and second, the greater 
effort they make allows firms to pay lower wages, which then discourages workers, causing them 
to reduce their effort. It is impossible a priori to determine which force will dominate. This article 
postulates that when faced with an increase in the subjective probability of dismissal, workers 




a2l l , 
which obtains provided that e w ew
a
w2m l . 
(ii) The reason why less effective demand reduces the level of employment is that firms adjust their 
production downward to match the lower effective demand, thus requiring less labour. 










Equation (29) shows that output decreases by the same amount as effective demand. The 
decrease in both output and labour costs and the increase in effort change profits. This can be analysed 
by obtaining their differential with respect to the subjective probability of dismissal:
 ,dp










a pa a a a a 2
P
= + − + −l l lS SX X# #& &  (30)
Equation (30) indicates that the reduction in labour costs and the increase in workers’ effort 
both generate higher profit, even though the lower level of employment reduces output and, thus, 
puts downward pressure on profit.10 In other words, profit grows because the gap between labour 
productivity and wages widens, despite the drop in sales. Thus, under this scenario, the increase in 
profit changes the factor distribution of income in favour of capitalists. 
The additional profit allows capitalist consumers to demand more consumer goods and more 










2b bP P= − − −





2bP= l  (32)
Expression (31) shows that capitalist consumers demand more labour because the price of labour 
has fallen, and their income has risen. Consequently, the employment of self-employed workers expands. 
10 See section 3 of annex A1.
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Moreover, inequality (32) shows that capitalists consume more goods when their income increases. Note 
that the fall in production and the growth of capitalist consumption imply that proletarian consumption 
declines, despite the increase in self-employment; in contrast, capitalists’ consumption of both goods 
and services increases. This is a consequence of the growth of profits, the decrease in wages received 
by both conventional and self-employed workers, and the reduction in conventional employment. 
8. Analysis of selected characteristics 
of the Mexican labour market 
(a) Concentration of income 
The first characteristic to analyse is the reduction in the workers’ share of national income. In this 
model, national income is composed of the value of goods production ( y0) plus the value of the services 
(wblb) services provided by workers to capitalist consumers. Consequently, the shares of profits and 
wages in national income (IN ) are defined, respectively, by:
 IN y w lb b0
P P=
+  (33) 
and  IN
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Equation (35) states that the profit share of national income rises, so the wage share falls. This 
happens because the profits outpace the growth of national income, since the fall in goods production 
is not sufficiently compensated by an increase in services to allow national income to grow by more 
than profits. 
The concentration of income in favour of profits means that the wage share of income declines, 
owing to the reduction in wages, the growth of more precarious employment (self-employment) and 
the reduction of conventional employment.
(b) Downward wage convergence
The second characteristic to analyse is downward wage convergence. According to equations (25) 
and (26), the wages of both conventional and self-employed workers decreased. However, downward 
wage convergence requires the wages of conventional workers to decrease by more than those of the

















2 . In other words, the difference 
between the increase in insecurity among conventional employees and the increase among the 
self-employed must exceed the wage gap.
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(c) Growth of precarious work and decrease 
in well-paid employment
The third and fourth characteristics of the Mexican labour market to be analysed are the facts that 
precarious employment expanded, while non-precarious employment declined. In terms of the model 
presented here, this means that employment that is lower paid, more insecure and requires greater 
effort, in other words self-employment, grew; in contrast, conventional employment decreased, which 
is consistent with inequalities (28) and (31). 
Conventional employment declines because the effective demand satisfied by firms is reduced 
owing to the lower wages received by conventional workers; in contrast, self-employment expands 
because higher profits and the lower wages of the self-employed allow capitalists to increase their 
demand for services.
(d) Manufacturing productivity grows faster than average 
The final characteristic of Mexico’s labour market to be analysed is the fact that the average 
productivity of tradable manufactured goods outpaces average total productivity. This means that there 
is a production sector in which productivity growth is above average. To analyse this phenomenon, note










 by definition, whereas 




b . Neither 
of the two productivities depends on the level of employment, since both are homogeneous of degree 0 
in employment. However, they respond in opposite ways to the increase in job insecurity. 
Productivity in the conventional sector increases in response to an increase in the subjective 
probability of dismissal. This is because if workers perceive a higher probability of dismissal, they work 










a a 2= +l l
l# &  (36)
In contrast, the average productivity of the services offered by the self-employed is reduced in the 
face of greater job insecurity. The reason is that, similarly to what happens with conventional workers, 
if the subjective probability of dismissal increases, self-employed workers work harder; consequently, 
capitalist consumers can pay lower wages. Lower wages means the services supplied are valued less, 












b pb a 1= l
l  (37)
The reduction in the average productivity of services means that the average productivity of the 
economy as a whole grows more slowly than the average productivity of the conventional sector, which 
is consistent with the data available for Mexico.
The results presented thus far stands in contrast to post-Kaleckian theory,11 which studies the 
factor distribution of income and its effects on employment and output. The main differences and 
similarities include the following:
11 It is not intended to make an exhaustive review of this literature here. See Hein (2014) for further details. 
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(i) In these post-Kaleckian models, the wage share of output declined owing to an increase in 
mark-up and in the degree of monopoly, which could be caused by exchange rate depreciations 
(Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990), interest rate hikes (Hein, 2014) or exogenous cuts in real wages. 
Unlike these models, in the analytical approach presented here, the wage share of income 
declines without assuming monopolies in the goods market and, hence, overpricing. However, 
postulating efficiency wages assumes non-competitive labour markets, in which capitalist firms 
and consumers can set wages according to their interests. This is because proletarians have to 
work for a living. Consequently, an increase in job insecurity enhances employers’ wage-setting 
power, which therefore causes the wage share of income to fall.
(ii) The models in question also have scenarios in which production is driven by wages or by 
profits. They recognize the dual nature of wages: as components of demand and as costs of 
production. Like these models, the analytical approach adopted in this article also recognizes 
the dual nature of wages; however, there are no mechanisms that translate higher enterprise 
profitability, sustained by a cut in wages, into effective demand growth, since neither investment 
nor net exports are studied —two issues that form part of the pending research agenda.
IV. Numerical exercise
To give greater clarity to the theoretical model presented here, a numerical example is presented below, 
based on a parametrically defined effort function, analogous to the one proposed by Velázquez and 
Hernández (2018): ,e w p w
a p1i i= − +
dR W  where a Rd + , 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < pi < 1 for all i = a, b. 
The characteristics of this function are:12
(i) ; ; ; ande e e e e0 0 0 0 0
,w w p p w pi i i2 1 2 1 =l m l m m
(ii) ,e w w
a0 1= −R W
(iii) ,e w w
a1 2= −R W





(v) ,lim e w p p1w i i= +"3
dR W
The characteristics of the effort function include the following: (i) effort will be positive whatever 
the subjective probability of dismissal. However, as agents expect this probability to rise, they will 
increase their effort; (ii) As the wage tends to 0, workers will cease making effort. On the other hand, 
as the wage tends to infinity, effort is bounded.
The relationship between the subjective dismissal rate of the self-employed and that of conventional 
workers is determined by:
 p pb ag {= +  (38)
where 0 < ζ < 1; 0 < ϕ < 1 and 0 < pb < pa .
Equation (38) shows that the subjective dismissal rate among the self-employed has one part 
that does not depend on what happens in the conventional sector (ζ ) and another that absorbs that 
sector’s insecurity (ϕ).
The production function will be ,y Ae w p la a0 = R W . The utility functions will be those proposed in 
equations (8) and (12). The numerical values of the parameters of the functions are specified in table 1.
12 The main difference between the function proposed by Velázquez and Hernández (2018) and the one put forward in this paper 
is that, in the former, the authors assume that the subjective probability of dismissal can be represented by the expectation of 
unemployment. 
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Table 1 
Parameters of the functions of production, effort,  
subjective probability of self-employed dismissal and utility
A a δ pa ζ ϕ α β τp
10 1 0.9 0.01 0.05 0.9 0.4 0.9 99
Source: Prepared by the author.
Note: A, a and δ are parameters; the first pertains to the production function, the next two to the effort function. α and β are the 
elasticities of utility with respect to consumption, of the proletarian consumer and the capitalist consumer, respectively 
(see the production, effort, and utility functions). 
The numerical exercise is presented in two scenarios. In the first, a demand-constrained equilibrium 
is calculated, in which the percentage of labour supply employed in the firms (φ ) is assumed known 
and exogenous. This assumption is dispensed with in the second case. This first scenario will serve 
as a starting point for analysing the precariousness of employment and the concentration of income. 
In the second scenario, it is assumed that the subjective probability of dismissal among conventional 
workers increases; this makes employment more precarious, concentrates income in favour of business 
owners, reduces the wage gap downwards, increases precarious employment, decreases conventional 
employment, and increases productivity in the conventional sector by more than average productivity. 
1. Scenario 1: demand-constrained equilibrium 
The parameters used in this scenario are the same as will be used in scenario 2 (see table 1).
The chosen parameters have the following features: the subjective probability of dismissal 
among conventional workers (pa) is 1%. In other words, workers feel relatively secure in their jobs. This 
value is chosen so that it can be increased in the next scenario. The proletarians represent 99% of 
the population (τ p). As the subjective probability of dismissal among conventional workers increases 
by 1.0 unit, that of the self-employed rises by 0.9. In other words, job insecurity is highly transferable 
from one sector to the other (ϕ). This assumption is made because, in the absence of unemployment 
insurance, workers laid off in the conventional sector will seek self-employment as a last resort to 
avoid unemployment. In addition to these parameters, formal employment is assumed to account for 
80% of the labour supply, so φ = 0.8. This is consistent with the fact that the self-employed in Mexico 
represent about 20% of the total labour force (INEGI, 2017). These parameters are used to obtain the 
allocations shown in table 2. 
Table 2 
Wages, allocations, and distribution in demand-constrained equilibrium
pa pb w a w b e (w a,pa ) e (w b,pb ) la lb
0.01 0.059 1.968 1.854 0.507 0.539 62.371 10.459
lb% u y0 Sa IN c c c p %c ct
14.361 5.489 316.8 19.4 336.2 174.602 142.197 57.704
%c pt Πσ M.S % %M.S Pmes Pmec Pmet
42.295 194.003 142.197 57.704 42.295 1.854 5.079 4.616
Source: Prepared by the author.
Note: p, w, e(w,p) and l are the subjective probability of dismissal, real wage, effort and labour demand, respectively; subscript 
or superscript “a” refers to the conventional worker and “b” to the self-employed worker; lb% is self-employment as a 
percentage of total employment; u is the unemployment rate; y0 is manufacturing output; Sa is the value of services; IN 
is national income; cc, %cc, c p and %c p are consumption by capitalists, their share of total consumption, consumption 
by proletarians and their share of total consumption, respectively; Π is the profit received by the capitalists from the 
enterprises they own; M.S. is the wage bill; %Π represents the profit share of national income; %M.S. is the share of 
wages in national income; Pmes, Pmec and Pmet represent average productivity in the service sector, the conventional 
sector and total, respectively.
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Table 2 shows the wages and allocations of the demand-constrained equilibrium. Workers 
employed by firms earn wages above those received by the self-employed. However, the latter make 
more effort, because their jobs are less secure, and they work harder to avoid dismissal. This, in turn 
encourages their employers to pay lower wages. Self-employed workers represent 14.361% of total 
employment. Note that this is less than the share of self-employed workers in the total labour force 
(φ = 0.2) because not all labour is employed. The unemployment rate (u) is 5.48%. The sum of the 
consumption of goods by workers and by capitalists equals the value of goods production, since firms 
adjust their production to what the market demands. National income (NI ) is the sum of the value of 
goods produced by firms and the value of services provided by the self-employed (Sa). Consumption by 
capitalists, of both goods and services (cct  ), absorbs 57.704% of national income, while the remaining 
42.295% corresponds to consumption by the proletariat. As would be expected, these percentages 
coincide with the functional distribution of income. Lastly, it can be seen that the average productivity of 
the conventional sector (Pmec) is higher than that of the self-employed services sector (Pmes). Average 
total productivity (Pmet) is therefore lower than that of the conventional sector.
2. Scenario 2: increasing precariousness and income 
concentration caused by heightened job insecurity
In this scenario it is assumed that the subjective probability of dismissal among conventional workers 
rises steadily; in other words the perception of insecurity in conventional employment increases. This 
hypothesis is based on the previous scenario, while exogenously varying just the value of the parameter pa. 
The results of this exercise are shown in table 3.
Table 3 
Changes in allocations, wages, and distribution in response to a sustained increase  
in the subjective probability of dismissal from conventional employment 
pa pb w a w b e (w a,pa ) e (w b,pb ) y yd0 = t la lb Sa IN Π M.S Pmec Pmes Pmet
0.02 0.068 1.943 1.837 0.515 0.544 315.163 61.222 10.685 19.624 334.787 196.236 138.550 5.148 1.837 4.656
0.03 0.077 1.918 1.819 0.521 0.550 313.677 60.172 10.899 19.825 333.502 198.250 135.252 5.213 1.819 4.693
0.04 0.086 1.895 1.802 0.528 0.555 312.300 59.193 11.105 20.011 332.311 200.106 132.205 5.276 1.802 4.727
0.05 0.095 1.874 1.785 0.534 0.560 311.010 58.271 11.305 20.183 331.193 201.834 129.359 5.337 1.785 4.760
0.06 0.104 1.853 1.769 0.540 0.565 309.793 57.396 11.499 20.345 330.139 203.455 126.684 5.397 1.769 4.792
0.07 0.113 1.833 1.754 0.546 0.570 308.640 56.563 11.689 20.498 329.139 204.982 124.157 5.457 1.754 4.822
0.08 0.122 1.813 1.738 0.551 0.575 307.544 55.766 11.875 20.643 328.187 206.427 121.760 5.515 1.738 4.852
0.09 0.131 1.795 1.723 0.557 0.580 306.500 55.002 12.058 20.780 327.279 207.797 119.482 5.573 1.723 4.880
0.10 0.14 1.776 1.709 0.563 0.585 305.501 54.268 12.237 20.910 326.411 209.101 117.310 5.629 1.709 4.908
0.11 0.149 1.759 1.695 0.569 0.590 304.545 53.562 12.413 21.034 325.580 210.343 115.237 5.686 1.695 4.935
0.12 0.158 1.742 1.681 0.574 0.595 303.629 52.881 12.586 21.153 324.782 211.528 113.253 5.742 1.681 4.961
0.13 0.167 1.725 1.667 0.580 0.600 302.748 52.224 12.757 21.266 324.015 212.662 111.352 5.797 1.667 4.986
0.14 0.176 1.709 1.654 0.585 0.605 301.902 51.589 12.925 21.375 323.277 213.748 109.529 5.852 1.654 5.011
0.15 0.185 1.693 1.641 0.591 0.610 301.087 50.974 13.091 21.479 322.566 214.788 107.778 5.907 1.641 5.035
0.20 0.23 1.620 1.579 0.617 0.633 297.343 48.156 13.890 21.935 319.278 219.353 99.925 6.175 1.579 5.146
Source: Prepared by the author.
Note: p, w, e(w,p) and l are the subjective probability of dismissal, the real wage, effort and labour demand, respectively; 
subscript or superscript “a” refers to the conventional worker and “b” to the self-employed worker; y0 is the value of 
manufacturing output; Sa is the value of services; IN is national income; is the profit received by the capitalists for owning 
the enterprises; M.S. is the wage bill; Pmes, Pmec and Pmet represent average productivity in the service sector, the 
conventional sector and total, respectively.
As table 3 shows, a sustained increase in the subjective probability of dismissal from conventional 
employment increases the subjective probability of dismissal among the self-employed. So, when pa is 
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0.02, pb is 0.068, but when pa increases to 0.2, then pb rises to 0.23. As the perception of insecurity in 
conventional employment grows, workers employed by firms see self-employment as a way to avoid 
unemployment. This would tend to increase the supply of services offered by the self-employed and 
thus make it harder for all of them to obtain work. Heightened job insecurity for both types of workers 
forces them to make a greater effort to avoid unemployment. Table 3 shows that as the subjective 
probability of dismissal increases, the effort made by workers also increases. However, the self-employed 
always make a greater effort than conventional workers, because their employment is inherently more 
insecure; that is, pa< pb in all cases.
The additional effort made by both types of worker allows their employers to cut wages, since 
they no longer need to motivate effort with high pay (see the wa and wb columns of table 3). However, 
as job insecurity increases by more among conventional workers than among the self-employed, the 
effort made by the former increases faster than that made by the latter, so, conventional worker wages 













Subjective probability of dismissal among conventional workers
Conventional worker wage Self-employed wage
Source: Prepared by the author, based on the wage of the conventional worker and the wage of the self-employed, for different 
values of the subjective probability of dismissal among conventional workers (data presented in table 3). 
Note: In both cases, real wages expressed in terms of units of output. 
The fall in the wages of conventional workers results in a reduction in effective demand, so firms 
cut back on their production and hire less labour. The y yd0 = t  column of table 3 shows the fall in effective 
demand; and, as production is equal to this, the next column (la) shows the employment downsizing 
that firms undertake to match their output to the smaller effective demand.
In table 3, the column labelled shows that firms’ profits grow, owing to a widening of the gap 
between their average productivity and the wage they pay. 
Figure 2 shows how the gap between the average productivity and wage indices widens as job 
insecurity increases. The average productivity of firms grows because workers increase their effort.
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Figure 2 
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Subjective probability of dismissal among conventional workers
PmesPmec
Source: Prepared by the author, based on average productivity data for conventional employment and conventional workers’ 
wages as shown in table 3. 
Rising profits and falling wages for self-employed workers cause capitalist consumers to demand 
more labour. As can be seen in the lb column of table 3, self-employment increases. 
The increased self-employment and reduced conventional employment are consistent with 
trends in the Mexican economy, where non-precarious jobs have been shrinking and precarious jobs 
have been expanding.
The generalized reduction in wages, together with the expansion of more precarious employment 
and the retreat of conventional employment cause the share of the wages in national income to shrink. 
The Π and M.S. columns of table 3 show that the wage share declined, and the profit share grew, as 
job insecurity increased. 
Lastly, it can be seen that the average productivity of the services provided by the self-employed 
decreased, owing to a reduction in their wages, which devalues the services they supply. In contrast, 
the productivity of firms increased, owing to the greater effort deployed by their workers. Both types of 
worker increased their effort, but with opposing effects on their average productivity. 
Figure 3 shows how the average productivity of the conventional sector outpaces the average 
total productivity index, because average productivity among self-employed services falls. 
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Subjective probability of dismissal
PmesPmec Pmet
Source: Prepared by the author, based on the data of the average productivities of the service sector, conventional sector and 
total, as presented in table 3. 
One of the main shortcomings of this analytical approach is that it does not incorporate the external 
sector, so it is effectively a world-economy model.13 However, the fact that the decline in the wage 
share and the increased precariousness of employment are two phenomena that have been observed 
worldwide, gives the model validity. Nonetheless, as the Mexican economy is one of the most open in 
the world, it is necessary to sketch conceptually how the results would change in an open-economy 
model. The increase in the subjective dismissal rate would cause workers to work harder and their 
wages to fall. Lower wages would make the export sector more competitive and foster its growth. This 
would allow for profit-driven growth scenarios, provided that the increase in exports outweighed the 
drop in proletarian consumption. In this scenario, employment could increase. 
V. Conclusions
The production globalization process that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s fuelled increasing 
job insecurity. This article has developed an efficiency-wage model in a demand-constrained equilibrium 
scenario, to show how the increase in job insecurity causes employment to become more precarious 
and the wage share of income to fall. In addition to arguing that job insecurity and income concentration 
may have a common, although not unique, cause, the study showed that the process that triggers 
heightened job insecurity can explain several characteristics of the Mexican economy.
The results of the theoretical model presented here suggest that improving workers’ conditions 
and reversing the process of income concentration require employment policies aimed at reducing 
job insecurity. 
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Annex A1 
1. Producer maximization 











































Rewriting (A1) gives: 
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As ,f e w p f,e w p l a la a a=l lRR WW , (A3) can be written as equation (4). 
Equation (A2) implies that: 
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Substituting (A3) into (A4) gives equation (3).
2. Demand-constrained equilibrium
To solve for equilibrium in the goods market, equation (21) and the respective buying and selling plans 
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. Substituting this expression, the definition of profit and equation (A6)
into the goods market equation (A5), gives equation (22); and equation (23) is obtained from (A7) 
and (A6) and the definition of . Lastly, incorporating the dual decision hypothesis and substituting 
equations (A6) and (A7) into (21), gives equation (24).
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3. Increase in profit caused an increase in the 
subjective probability of unemployment
To analyse the sign of expression (30), (29) and (27) are substituted into it, to obtain:
 dp








1 a a a
P
= − −− l  (A8)
Assuming that l l dp la p a a1 a .+− l  and substituting this idea in (A8), gives:
 dp






a pa a a
P
=− −l l  (A9)





 if and only if w w dp,a p
a
aa2 , in other words whenever the wage 
is greater than the absolute amount by which it is reduced. This is true for all w > 0.
